[Part of Constituting America’s 90 Day Study - Days that Shaped America]
America’s
bloodiest day was also the most geopolitically significant battle of the Civil
War.
On September 17, 1862, twelve hours of battle along the Antietam Creek, near
Sharpsburg, Maryland, resulted in 23,000 Union and Confederate dead or wounded.
Its military outcome was General Robert E. Lee, and his Army of Northern
Virginia, retreating back into Virginia. Its political outcome reshaped global
politics and doomed the Southern cause.
The
importance of Antietam begins with President Abraham Lincoln weighing how to
characterize the Civil War to both domestic and international audiences.
Lincoln choose to make “disunion” the issue instead of slavery. His priority was
retaining the border states (Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri) within
the Union. [1]
The
first casualties of the Civil War occurred on April 19, 1861 on the streets of
Baltimore. The 6th Massachusetts Regiment was attacked by pro-South
demonstrators while they were changing trains. Sixteen dead soldiers and
citizens validated Lincoln’s choice of making the Civil War about
reunification. Eastern Maryland was heavily pro-slave. Had Maryland seceded,
Washington, DC would have been an island within the Confederacy. This would
have spelled disaster for the North.
To
affirm the “war between the states” nature of the Civil War, Lincoln’s
Secretary of State, William Seward, issued strict instructions to American
envoys to avoid referencing slavery when discussing the Civil War. [2]
Explaining
to foreign governments that the conflict was simply a “war between the states” had
a downside. England and France were dependent on Southern cotton for their
textile mills. “Moral equivalency” of the combatants allowed political
judgements to be based on economic concerns. [3]
On
April 27, 1861, Lincoln and Seward further complicated matters by announcing a
blockade of Southern ports. While this
was vital to depriving the South of supplies, it forced European governments to
determine whether to comply. There were well established international
procedures for handling conflicts between nations and civil wars. Seward
ignored these conventions, igniting fierce debate in foreign governments over
what to do with America. [4]
England
and France opted for neutrality, which officially recognized the blockade, but
with no enforcement. Blockade runners gathered in Bermuda, and easily avoided
the poorly organized Union naval forces, while conducting commerce with
Southern ports. [5]
Matters
got worse. On November 8, 1861, a Union naval warship stopped the Trent, a neutral
British steamer travelling from Havana to London. Captain Charles Wilkes
removed two Confederate Government Commissioners, James Mason and John Slidell,
who were on their way for meetings with the British Government. [6]
The
“Trent Affair” echoed the British stopping neutral American ships during the
Napoleonic Wars. Those acts were the main reason for American initiating the
War of 1812 with England.
British
Prime Minister, Lord Henry Palmerston, issued an angry ultimatum to Lincoln
demanding immediate release of the Commissioners. He also moved 11,000 British
troops to Canada to reinforce its border with America. Lincoln backed down,
releasing the Commissioners, stating “One war at a time”. [7]
While war with England
was forestalled, economic issues were driving a wedge between the Lincoln
Administration and Europe.
The 1861 harvest of
Southern cotton had shipped just before war broke out. In 1862, the South’s
cotton exports were disrupted by the war. Textile owners clamored for British
intervention to force a negotiated peace.
In the early summer of
1862, bowing to political and economic pressure, Lord Palmerston drafted
legislation to officially recognize the Confederate government and press for
peace negotiations. [8]
During the
Spring of 1862, Lincoln’s view of the Civil War was shifting. Union forces were
attracting escaped slaves wherever they entered Southern territory. Union
General’s welcomed the slaves as “contraband”, prizes of war similar to
capturing the enemy’s weapons. This gave Lincoln a legal basis for establishing
a policy for emancipating slaves in the areas of conflict.
Union victories had
solidified the Border States into the North. Therefore, disunion was not as
important a justification for military action. In fact, shedding blood solely for
reunification seemed to be souring Northern support for the war.
Lincoln and Seward
realized emancipating slaves could rekindle Northern support for the war,
critical for winning the Congressional elections in November 1862. Emancipation
would also place the conflict on firm moral grounds, ending European support
for recognition and intervention. England had abolished slavery throughout its
empire in 1833. It would not side with a slave nation, if the goal of war
became emancipation. Lincoln embraced this geopolitical chess board,
“Emancipation would weaken the rebels by drawing off their laborers, would help
us in Europe, and convince them that we are incited by something more than
ambition”. [9]
On July 22, 1862, Lincoln called a Cabinet meeting to announce his intention to issue the Emancipation Proclamation. It was framed as an imperative of war, “by virtue of the power in me vested as Commander-in-Chief, of the Army and Navy of the United States in time of actual armed rebellion against the authority and government of the United States, and as a fit and necessary war measure for suppressing said rebellion.” [10]
On July 22, 1862, Lincoln called a Cabinet meeting to announce his intention to issue the Emancipation Proclamation. It was framed as an imperative of war, “by virtue of the power in me vested as Commander-in-Chief, of the Army and Navy of the United States in time of actual armed rebellion against the authority and government of the United States, and as a fit and necessary war measure for suppressing said rebellion.” [10]
Seward
raised concerns over the timing of the Proclamation. He felt recent Union
defeats outside of the Confederate Capital of Richmond, Virginia might make its
issuance look like an act of desperation, “our last shriek, on the retreat.” [11]
It was decided to wait for a Northern victory so that the Emancipation could be
issued from a position of strength.
Striving for a game-changing victory became the priority for both sides. The summer of 1862 witnessed a series of brilliant Confederate victories. British Prime Minister Palmerston agreed to finally hold a Cabinet meeting to formally decide on recognition and mediation. [12]
Striving for a game-changing victory became the priority for both sides. The summer of 1862 witnessed a series of brilliant Confederate victories. British Prime Minister Palmerston agreed to finally hold a Cabinet meeting to formally decide on recognition and mediation. [12]
General Lee wished to
tip the scales further by engineering a Confederate victory on northern soil. [13]
Lee wanted a victory like the 1777 Battle of Saratoga that brought French
recognition and aid to America. [14]
The race was on. General Stonewall Jackson annihilated General John Pope’s Army in the Second Battle of Manassas (August 28-30, 1862). Lee saw his opportunity, consolidated his forces, and invaded Maryland on September 4, 1862.
The race was on. General Stonewall Jackson annihilated General John Pope’s Army in the Second Battle of Manassas (August 28-30, 1862). Lee saw his opportunity, consolidated his forces, and invaded Maryland on September 4, 1862.
After entering
Frederick, Maryland, Lee divided his forces to eliminate the large Union
garrison in Harpers Ferry, which was astride his supply lines. Lee planned to draw
General George McClellan and his “Army of the Potomac” deep into western
Maryland. Far from Union logistical support, McClellan’s forces could be
destroyed, delivering a devastating blow to the North. [15]
A copy of Special Orders No.
191, which outlined Lee’s plans and troop movements, was lost by the
Confederates, and found by a Union patrol outside of Frederick. [15] On reading
the Order, McClellan, famous for his slow and ponderous actions in the field,
sped his pursuit of Lee.
Now there was a deadly
race for whether Lee and Jackson could neutralize Harpers Ferry and reunite
before McClellan’s army pounced. This turned the siege of Harpers Ferry
(September 12-15, 1862), the Battle of South Mountain (September 14, 1862), and
Antietam (September 17, 1862) into the Civil War’s most important series of
battles.
While Antietam was tactically
a draw, heavy losses forced Lee and his army back into Virginia. This was
enough for Lincoln to issue his Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, five
days after the battle, on September 22, 1862. When news of the Confederate
retreat reached England, support for recognition collapsed, extinguishing, “the
last prospect of European intervention.” [17] News of the Emancipation
Proclamation launched “Emancipation Meetings” throughout England. Support for a
Union victory rippled through even pacifist Anti-Slavery groups who asserted abolition,
“was possible only in a united America.” [18]
There were many more
battles to be fought, but Europe’s alignment against the Confederacy sealed its
fate. European nations flocked to embrace Lincoln and his Emancipation crusade.
One vivid example was Czar Alexander II, who had emancipated Russia’s serfs,
becoming a friend of Lincoln. In the fall of 1863, he sent Russian fleets to
New York City and San Francisco to support the Union cause. [19]
Unifying European
nations against the Confederacy, and ending slavery in the South, makes
America’s bloodiest day one of the world’s major events.
REFERENCES
[1] McPherson, James, Battle
Cry of Freedom (Oxford University Press, New York, 1988) pp. 311-312.
[2] Foreman, Amanda, A
World on Fire; Britain’s Crucial Role in the American Civil War (Random
House, New York, 2010) p.107.
[3] Op. cit., McPherson,
p. 384.
[4] Op. cit., Foreman,
page 80.
[5] Op. cit., McPherson,
pages 380-381.
[6] ibid., pages
389-391.
[7] ibid.
[8] Op. cit.,
Foreman, page 293.
[9] Op. cit., McPherson, page 510.
[9] Op. cit., McPherson, page 510.
[10]
Carpenter, Francis, How the Emancipation Proclamation was Drafted;
Political Recollections; Anthology - America; Great Crises in Our History Told
by its Makers; Vol. VIII (Veterans of Foreign Wars, Chicago, 1925) pages
160-161.
[11] Op. cit., McPherson, page 505.
[12] Op. cit., Foreman, page 295.
[13] Op. cit., McPherson, page 555.
[11] Op. cit., McPherson, page 505.
[12] Op. cit., Foreman, page 295.
[13] Op. cit., McPherson, page 555.
[14] McPherson, James, The
Saratoga That Wasn’t: The Impact of Antietam Abroad, in This Mighty
Scourge: Perspectives on the Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press,
2007), pages 65-77.
[15] Sears, Stephen W., Landscape
Turned Red (Ticknor & Fields, New York, 1983) pages 66-67.
[16] Ibid., pages
112-113.
[17] Op. cit., Foreman, page 322.
[18] ibid., page 397.
[17] Op. cit., Foreman, page 322.
[18] ibid., page 397.
[19] The Russian Navy
Visits the United States (Naval Historical Foundation, Annapolis, 1969)
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